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NOTES
The curriculum of the School remains substantially as it was,
with the addition, however, of a required course in the Admin-
istration of Justice, which extends over one hour a week
throughout the senior year. Dean William G. Hale conducts this
course.
STATUTORY PRESCRIPTION OF FORM OF OPINIONS
IN MISSOURI
A vigorous invective attacking critically two Missouri statutes
is contained in the recent case of Smarr et al. v. Smarr et al. in
which Judge Atwood handed down the opinion., The court says:
Observing the difficulty that has evidently attended the
effort of counsel on both sides of this case to comply with
our rule that they present a fair and concise statement of
the facts of the case without reiteration, statement of law,
or argument, we are reminded of our own dilemma when we
endeavor to comply with a certain statutory mandate and
at the same time bring our statement of the case within
the reasonable compass of an opinion.
The statutes which are subjected to criticism follow:
In each case determined by the supreme court or courts
of appeals, or finally disposed of upon a motion, the opin-
ion of the court shall be reduced to writing and filed in the
cause, and shall show which of the judges delivered the
same, and which concur therein or dissent therefrom. R. S.
Mo. (1919) sec. 1518.
The opinion shall always contain a sufficient statement
of the case, so that it may be understood without reference
to the record and proceedings in the same. R. S. Mo. (1919)
sec. 1519.
A brief statutory and case history of these statutes is neces-
sary to a consideration of the court's indictment.
In 1871, the legislature enacted two laws, the antecedents of
those now in force, and the substance of those laws was the
same as that of the laws in effect at the present time.2 How-
ever, the legislation in 1871 pertained only to the Supreme Court,
none of the courts of appeals having been established. In 1879,
the statutes were amended, and became applicable to the Saint
Louis Court of Appeals.3
(Mo. 1928), 6 S. W. (2d) 860, 861, 862.
'Mo. Laws 1871, 50, secs. 39 and 40.
R. S. Mo. (1879) sec. 3781, sec. 3782, sec. 3785.
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In 1881,4 and again in 1883,5 the legislature passed a measure
providing that
It shall not be necessary for the supreme court to file or
prepare a written opinion in any cause, except such as shall
be remanded for re-hearing or shall, in the judgment of
the court, involve a principle or question not settled in an
opinion of the court previously delivered and reduced to
writing and filed; but in every case not embraced in the
foregoing exception, it shall be optional with the court
whether or not an opinion in writing shall be prepared.
The effect of this law was to abrogate the acts of 1871 as far
as the Supreme Court was concerned, but it is to be observed
that this law in no way modified the provisions then operating
upon the Saint Louis Court of Appeals. However, in 1889,0
the legislature again reversed its position and enacted laws
which continue on the statute books at the present time and are
those to which Judge Atwood takes exception.
It is of peculiar significance that the two statutes under dis-
cussion are applicable only in civil cases. A study of criminal
and civil cases reveals that the courts invariably treat the facts
and the law similarly whether the decision be in a criminal or
civil cause. And this observation might well lead to the con-
clusion that the statutes are not deserving of the great amount
of discredit which Judge Atwood heaps upon them. Suffice it
to say that in other jurisdictions similar laws have been enacted,
but seemingly such laws have been made applicable both to
criminal and civil cases.7
The laws have been invoked by the courts only four times in
the past thirty-five years. Prior thereto they were not cited.
One of the laws was referred to for the first time in the case of
Merriam v. St. Louis C. G. & Ft. S. R'y. Co. in 1894 when the
court held that under the law 1 a party is entitled to a written
statement of the opinion of the court.0 Eight years later the
court held that under the same law it was appropriate for the
'Mo. Laws 1881, 111.
IMo. Laws 1883, 61.
8 Mo. Laws 1889, 210, secs. 3781 and 3782.
'R. S. Ill. (1925) c. 37, sec. 49; Iowa Code (1924) p. 1657, sec. 12813; Ga.
Ann. Code (Michie, 1926) sec. 6202; Miss. Ann. Code (Hemmingway, 1927)
sec. 3399; Mont. Rev. Codes (Choate, 1921) sec. 8801; W. Va. Code (Barnes,
1923) p. 2465, sec. 22.
' Now R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 1518.
'Merriam v. St. Louis C. G. & Ft. S. R'y Co. (1894), 126 Mo. 445, 29
S. W. 152.
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court to state its reasons for a decision. This was in the case
of Burdett v. Dale.10
In 1911, speaking in the case of Turner v. Anderson, Judge
Lamm said:
It [now R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 1519], also requires a
"statement." Mark the language, a statement of a certain
scope and sort, viz., one "that shall be understood" etc.
The term "understood," in the connection used by the law-
maker, invites observation. But as they spring spontane-
ously, any discriminating and good-humored reader can
make them for himself. Heretofore this statutory mandate
has been deemed either obligatory or has been obeyed in a
spirit of comity or out of deference to the lawmaking power.
However, a certain natural and untoward thing has hap-
pened. The statute is the chief factor swelling the length
of appellate opinions and causing them, now and then to
be much murmured against. For the present we reserve
the point, but it may be worth while soon to gravely consider
and finally determine whether that statute is constitutional
and should be longer obeyed.:"
The judge then refers to a California case1 2 in which Justice
Field commented that such a statute represented an encroach-
ment of the legislature upon the judiciary. Without ruling on
this question, Judge Lamm continues:
We pass the matter with the suggestion that a "state-
ment" of the instant case (giving to that term the mean-
ing of a summary of the evidence of 67 witnesses in just
outline, color and connection) could not be compressed with-
in modest or reasonable bounds, and made either intelligible
or valuable. Accordingly we shall give our impressions of
the salient features of the case omitting details.
That such statutes are unconstitutional is most unlikely. They
merely lay down rules of procedure for the court to follow, and
do not seem to usurp any judicial function.
An effect of the statutes was to provide legislation restricting
the appellate courts from handing down memorandum opinions.
In this connection it may be observed that the Supreme Court
never has engaged in such a practice. The Saint Louis Court
of Appeals which was established in 1877 continued to render
memorandum opinions until 1885, although in 1879 the statutes
had been made applicable to the court.
" Burdett v. Dale (1902), 85 Mo. A. 511, 69 S. W. 480.
' (1911) 236 Mo. 523, 530, 139 S. W. 180.
"Houston v. Williams (1859), 13 Cal. 24.
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The judges of the Missouri courts in their attack upon the
statutes have not advocated memorandum opinions. However,
Professor Edward H. Warren, apparently having observed the
practice before the Supreme Court of the United States and ap-
pellate courts of New York, has suggested that courts should
write "a mere memorandum opinion in cases which do not de-
serve an extended opinion."13 The proposal is sound, but the
problem is to determine which cases do and which do not deserve
an "extended opinion." Another difficulty is that in memo-
randum cases the reasons for the decisions are not set forth.
In the event that such cases are cited authoritatively by courts
or counsel in subsequent cases, no reason can be assigned ex-
cept that of stare decisis. On the other hand, memorandum
opinions would assist the courts materially by providing a means
of disposing of the innumerable cases now crowding the dockets.
The direct criticism of the statutes has been that they unduly
swell opinions. Eliminating, as the Missouri courts have, a
consideration of an amendment of the present statutes to pro-
vide for memorandum opinions, and with due deference to
Judge Lamm and to Judge Atwood, who in the Smarr case de-
cided in 1928, referred authoritatively to Judge Lamm's opinion
in the Turner case, it seems that the statutes have not imposed
upon appellate courts such a great burden as the judges believe.
In the first place, courts in Missouri under our statutes are
not required to write more elaborate opinions than courts in
many other states.
Secondly, if the courts were greatly concerned, they would
reduce opinions in criminal cases, but in actual fact, as has been
observed, opinions both in criminal and civil cases are substan-
tially of the same nature.
Finally, the statutes should be given a reasonable construc-
tion. Surely they never were intended to require the courts to
set out in great detail the testimony of fifty or a hundred wit-
nesses. What is required is a sufficient statement of the case
so that it can be understood without reference to the record
and proceedings in the same. Such provisions materially as-
sist attorneys in reading cases which, but for the statute, might
be unintelligible.
It may be concluded that Judge Atwood has not violated the
spirit or legal bounds of the statutes when he writes:
Hence, in this opinion, although we have painstakingly
examined the entire record, which is voluminous, we deem
it proper to submit the result of our labor as briefly as an
intelligible statement of the substance of the case will per-
Warren, The Welter of Decisions (1916) 10 ILL. L. Rnv. 472, 475.
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mit without incorporating any lengthy quotation or burden-
some digest of the pleadings, evidence, and proceedings."4
ROBERT E. IROSENWALD, '30.
JURISDICTION TO AWARD ALIMONY IN MISSOURI
WHERE DEFENDANT IS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED
In making awards for alimony courts are often faced with
difficult and peculiar problems. The deserted wife, attempts
of the husband to evade jurisdiction, the question of reaching
property left behind him-all these are factors which the court
must take into consideration. It is inevitable that occasional
conflicts should result between unbending statutory regulations
and the desire on the part of the court to distribute justice in
extreme cases.
Prior to the case of Chapman v. Chapman' there had been no
adjudication in Missouri of the question whether a deserted wife
may have her absconding husband's property within the juris-
diction of the court seized and appropriated to the payment of
alimony for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff. In
that case the plaintiff sued for divorce, also praying that a re-
ceiver be appointed to take charge of real estate alleged to be the
property of the absconding husband, and appropriate it to the
payment of alimony in gross in the form of a special lien against
the property. Plaintiff charged that her husband attempted
to convey the property to his brother in fraud of her rights, and
joined the brother as a defendant. Plaintiff had adequate
grounds for divorce. Service on both defendants was by publi-
cation. Both defaulted. The trial court granted plaintiff a
divorce, but declined to make any order touching the matter of
alimony and dismissed the "bill" as to the brother. The Court
of Appeals allowed the alimony, but the judgment of the trial
court was affirmed by the Supreme Court.2
The trial court, in holding itself without jurisdiction to render
any judgment for alimony without personal service on the hus-
band, reiterated the position taken by the courts of practically
all the states,sthe occasional exceptions being by virtue of statute.
4
See note 1, supra.
(1916), 194 Mo. A. 483, 185 S. W. 221.
'(1917), 269 Mo. 663, 192 S. W. 448.
For earlier Missouri cases to this effect, see Ellison v. Martin (1873), 53
Mo. 575; Hedrix v. Hedrix (1903), 103 Mo. A. 40, 77 S. W. 495; Elvins
v. Elvins (1913), 176 Mo. A., 1. c. 651, 159 S. W. 746, cases cited; Moss v.
Fitch (1908), 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 475.
' The New York statute is typical, and will be considered later in detail.
Laws 1923, sec. 1171-a c. 51.
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